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In the

SUPREME COURT
of the

State of Utah
CALIFORNIA PACKING CORPORATION, a Corporation,
Plaintiff,

vs.
\
STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Defendant.
'

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The California Packing Corporation, the plaintiff
in this action, which will hereinafter be called the Company, is a corporation organized and existing under
and by virtue of the laws of the State of New York. It
has qualified to do business in the State of Utah, and
does business in this State. Because of its activities in
the State of Utah, it is required to file returns and pay
tax pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 13, of Title
80, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933 as amended. This
law hereinafter in this brief will be referred to a.s the
,Franchise Tax Act. The Company filed its Franchise
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Tax return for the fiscal year commencing March 1, 1935,
and ending February 29, 1936. The State Tax Commission, hereafter in this brief called the Commission,
audited the return of the Company and proposed a deficiency in tax. The tax payer objected to the proposed
deficiency, and requested a hearing for redetermination
of the deficiency. This hearing was granted, and on
January 6, 1938, the matter was heard before the Commlsswn. On June 24, 1938, the Commis·sion rendered
its decision in the matter, and the Company, being dissatisfied with the decision, and pursuant to Section 47,
Chapter 13, Title 80, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, petitioned this Honorable Court to review the decision of
the Commission. Under the provisions of the Franchise
Tax Act, this Court by Certiorari may review the decision
of the Commission on both the law and the facts.
Because the Uourt can review both the law and the
facts in this case, and because the questions involved
have never been passed upon or touched by this Court
in any pervious decision, the Plaintiff is going to take
the liberty of reciting the statutes and the facts very
fully. We ask the Court's indulgence.
The California Packing Corporation ts engaged
primarily in the business of packing and canning fruits,
vegetables, fish, and in general all canned merchandise,
and in merchandising its products so processed. The
products processed by the Company a're commonly
known under the trade name of "Del Monte Brand".
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The company sells its products in all forty-eight states
in the Union and in foreign countries. The Company
owns and operates several canning factories in the
State of Utah, where it cans fruits and vegetables. The
products processed in the State of Utah are sold wherever the Company does business. The Company maintains no sales office in the State of Utah. All sales of
its products made in the State of Utah are made by salesmen sent out from premises for the transaction of business owned or rented by the Corporation outside this
state. It is apparent from the record in this case, that
the business of this corporation is the normal business
of processing and selling and that in the conduct of the
business there is nothing exceptional.
Corporations which do business in the State of Utah
and in other states, are required to allocate to the State
of Utah their net income by using apportionment factors.
This method of allocation of income is set forth in Subsections 6, 7, and 8 of Section 21 of Franchise Tax Act
and is as follow<&:
"
( 6) If the bank or other corporation carries on any business outside this state, the said
remainder may be divided into three equal parts:
(a) Of one third, such portion shall be attributed to business carried on within this state
as shall be found by multiplying said third by a
fraction whose numerator is the value of the corporation's tangible property situated within this
state and whose denominator is the value of all

the corpor~tion ts tangible property wherever
situated.
(b) Of another thirdt such portion shall be
attributed to busine·ss carried on within this
state as shall be found by multiplying said third
by a fraction whose numerator is the total amount
expended by the corporation for wages, salaries,
commissions or other compensation to its employees and assignable to this state and whose
denominator is the total expenditures of the corporation for wages, salaries, commissions or
other compensation to all of its employees.
(c) Of the remaining third, such portion
shall be attributed to busines·s carried on within
this state as shall be found by multiplying said
third by a fraction whose numerator is the amount
of the corporation's gross receipts from business
assignable to this state, and whose denominator
is the amount of the corporation's gross recipts
from all its business.
(d) The amount assignable to this state of
expenditures of the corporation for wages, salaries, commissions or other compensation to its
employees shall be such expenditure for the taxable year as represents the compensation of employees not chiefly situated at, connected with or
sent out from, premises for the transaction of
business owned or rented by the corporation outside this ·State.
(e) The amount of the corporation's gross
receipts from business assignable to this state
shall be the amount of its gross receipts for the
taxable year from
(1st) Sales, except those negotiated or
effected in behalf of the corporation by agents or
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agenc~es

chiefly situated at, connected with or
sent out from premises for the transaction of
business owned or rented by the corporation outside this state, and sales otherwise determined by
the tax con1mission to be attributable to the business conducted on such premises,
(2nd) Rentals or royalties from property situated, or from the use of patents, within
this state.
(f) The value of the corporation's tangible
property for the purpose of this section shall be
the average value of -such property during the
taxable year.
(7) In the allocation of net income, gain or
loss shall be recognized and shall be computed on
the same basis and in the same manner as is provided in this chapter for the determination of net
income.
(8) If in the judgment of the tax commission the application of the foregoing rules does
not allocate to this state the proportion of net
income fairly and equitably attributable to this
sta.te, it may with such information as it may be
able to obtain make such allocation as is fairly
calcttlated to assign to this state the portion .of
net income reasonably attributable to the business done within this state and to avoid subjecting the taxpayer to dou.ble taxation.

(Italics Ours)
The company in filing its Franchise Tax return, and
in determining the allocation fraction to assign income
attributable to business done in the State of Utah, used
the three factors set out in the Statute:
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1.

2.
3.

In Utah
Tangible Property
$1,121,746.55

$32,672,848.61

.034333

Salaries and Wages
284,014.19

10,936,056.31

.025970

55,511,789.30

.000000

Sales

None

Total

Total
Allocation ]'raction ( 1-3 of above)

Fraction

.060303
.020101

It will be observed that the Company in determining

the apportionment fraction did not allocate to Utah any
sales as being made by salesmen or agents sent out from
premises for the transaction, of business owned or rented by the Corporation inside the State of Utah. This is
in conformity with the statute. There is no finding
made by the commission, nor is there any evidence ~n
the record which would support a finding that the Company did make sales from premises located in the State
of Utah. The Tax Comission in its decision ignored
the definition of sales as set forth in the statute auu allocated to this State sales of goods which were stored
in the State of Utah at the time of sale. It is the position of the Company that there is no foundation either
by reason of any statute or evidence that the Comn;ission in its decision was justified in departing from the
normal manner of determining the sales factor, but that
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on the contrary the decision of the Commission is entirely arbitrary and unwarranted by reason of both the
law and the facts in this case. Under Lhe decision of
the Commission, the allocation fraction is as f::.llows:
In and
Outside Utah

1.

2.
3.

4.

In Utah
Total tangible property
1,121,746.55
32,672,848.61
'l'otal wages, etc.
284,014.19
10,936,056.31
Total gross receipts
2,122,110.26
55,511,789.30
Total 1, 2, & 3

Fraction
.034333
.025970
.038228
.098531

---5.

Apportionment fraction-1-3 of 4

.032844

The amount shown as No. 3, total gross receipts,
represents sales of goods which were stored in Utah at
the time the sale was made. The sales of these goods
could have been consummated in any state in the Union,
and they could have been consigned to any state in the
Union. But none of these goods were sold by agents or
salesmen sent out from premises within the State of
Utah. The only evidence (if it can be called evidence)
in this record which would in any way tend to sustain
the ruling of the Commission is the introduction by tho
Commission of the franchise tax returns of the Utah
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Packing Corporation. The Utah Packing Corporation
before its dissolution, was a wholly owned subsidiary of
the California Packing Corporation. The Utah Packing
Corporation did no business outside of the State of Utah,
and was a Utah Corporation. The return of the California Packing Corporation is in no way connected with
the prior returns of the Utah Packing Corporation, and
all that the returns of the Utah Packing Corporation
show is that they paid a larger franchise tax than the
California Packing Corporation. There is nothing in
the evidence to show why the Utah Packing Corporation
paid a larger tax or why the California Packing Corporation paid a smaller tax. The two are separate and distinct
entities, and we submit there is no evidence or no linking
up of the two returns which in any way make the returns
of the Utah Packing Corporation relevant or material
in this action. The Utah Packing Corporation at the
time the returns in question were filed was out of existence, there having been a reorganization of the California Packing Corporation in which its subsidiary companies were dissolved and all of the business conducted
by the parent corporation, the California Packing Corporation. More will be said relative to this evidence
in the argument.
The Tax Commission in its decision reached another
conclusion which the company deems to be contrary to
the facts and to the law in this case. As has been said
before, the California Packing Corporation is a corpora-
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tion organized and existing under and by virtue of the
laws of the State of New York. Most of its busines-s is
transacted and its main office is located in San Francisco, California. The California Packing Corporation
owns stocks, bonds and other properties from which it
obtains interest, dividends and rentals. The income of
the Company by reason of the owner·ship of stocks, bonds
and other intangibles, for the year in question, received
outside of the State of Utah, and on the return of the
Company specifically allocated outside the State of Utah
amounted to $878,347.32. Section 21 of Chapter 13
Title 80 Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, Subsection 1,
provides as follows:
''Rents, interest and dividends derived from
business done outside this state, less related expenses, shall not be allocated to this state."
The company allocated specifically to the State of
Utah rents and interest from properties located within
the state, and specifically allocated outside the state,
rents, interest and dividends received on property outside the state.
The ~ ax Commission m redetermining the tax of
the company, included this income, which we shall term
financial income, in that gross income, and apportioned
it by using the allocation fraction. This the Company
deems to be contrary to the law as set forth in the franchise Tax Act, and unconstitutional under the Federal
Constitution.

1
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QUESTIONS OF LAW
As the plaintiff views this case, the decision of the
Commission raises the following questions of law:
1. Can the Commission depart from the use of
the normal allocation factors to impose a greater tax
upon the Company. This involves a question of construction of the statutes which have been set forth above.
It is the contention of the plaintiff that it was the intention of the legislature to limit the Commission in departing from the application of the normal allocation
factors to those cases where a corporation doing business in and out of the State of Utah would be subjected
to double taxation and an inequitable tax by the application of the normal fractions.
2. 'l_1he next question as we view the case is whether
or not (if we concede, which we do not, that the Tax Commission has the power to ignore the allocation fraction)
there are sufficient finding's or is there sufficient evidence
in this record to justify the Commission in making such
a finding or in reaching the conclusion which it has reached.
3. It is the position of the plaintiff that the Commission by departing from the use of the normal allocation fraction is subjecting this taxpayer to double taxation, and that by so doing, the Commission is violating
the clear mandate of the law and of the 14th amendment
to the constitution of the United States and Article V of
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the constitution of Utah by taking the property of this
plaintiff without due process of law.
On the question of the inclusion of financial rev~nue to net income assignable to business done in this
state and the apportionment of such income by the use
of the allocation factors, the plaintiff believes that there
is raised the following questions of law:
4. 'rhe Commission by so including financial revenue is violating the clear mandate of the statute. This
income cannot under the law be attributable to business
done in the State of Utah.
5. The inclusion of such financial revenue and the
subjecting of such income to the allocation factor, subjects this plaintiff to double taxation contrary to the
mandate of the franchise tax act, and the 14th amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article
V of the Constitution of Utah.
6. The inclusion of financial revenue which is not
attributable to business done within this state by using
an allocation fraction which does not take into consideration intangibles located in and out of the State of
Utah, is contrary to the 14th amendment of the Federal
Constitution and Article V of the Constitution of Utah
by reason of the fact that it takes this taxpayers prop~
erty without due process of law.
ARGUMENT
History and General Discussion of Utah Franchise
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Tax Act
The State of Utah prior to the decision of the Supreme Court of this state, in the case of Minneapolis
Steel and Machinery Company vs. Crockett, 263 "P"
926, imposed a tax upon corporations both foreign and
domestic, based upon the authorized capital stock of
such corporations without regard to where such capital
was employed. This Court in the above cited case, held
that such a license fee violated the Federal Constitution
and that such method of taxation could not be employed.
The basis of the decision was that the State of Utah
was imposing a license fee or tax upon capital over which
it had no jurisdiction.
The then Governor of the State appointed a commission to study the tax structure of the State. One, of the
purposes of this commission was to study a proper corporation tax which would be constitutional. The Commission recommended the adoption by the legislature of
what is commonly called the Massachusetts system. The
legislature in the main followed the advice of the Tax
Revision Commission and enacted the present Franchise
Tax Act. There are material variations between our
present law and the Massachusetts law, but in theory,
the two are the same. The difficulty encountered by most
states in :finding a constitutional tax has been the same
difficulty which was present under the old Utah law, i.e.,
to allocate to the state only that proportion of income
or capital employed which is connected with business
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done in the state. Any method of allocating income
such as is done under the Utah law must of necessity be
arbitrary in its nature. Unless there is a showing by
a particular corporation, that the method which is set
forth by the legislature in its application to that corpora-tion, taxes income which is not attributable to business
done within the state, then such method of allocating i'3
entirely constitutional. The legislature of the State of
Utah, to insure the constitutionality of the Franchise
Tax Act, granted the Tax Commission the power to make
adjustments in such cases.
1. Can the Commission depart from the use of the
normal allocati.on factors to impose a greater tax upon

the Cmnpany. This involves a question of construction of
the statutes which have been set out above. It is the
contention of the plaintiff that it was the intention. of the
legislature to limit the Commission in departing from the
application of the normal allocation factors to those
cases where a oorporation doing business in and out of
the State of Utah would be subjected to double taxation
and an inequitable tax by the application of the normal
fractions.
With the general history of the Utah law in mind,
and the difficulties which have been encountered in this
state and other states in imposing either a tax based
upon capital employed or upon income, we believe that
it is proper that at this time we discuss the intent of
the legislature and what we believe to be the limitations
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imposed by the legislaure upon the Tax Commission in
departing from the normal allocation factors. 'rhe Tax
Commission in this case, departed from the normal allocation factor relating to sales. Their authority for
doing so must be granted by the statute. The only possible authority which the Commission have under the
statute must be derived from sub-paragraph (e) of subsection 6 of Section 21, Chapter 13, Title 80, Revised
Statutes of Utah, 1933, or subsection 8 of the same section and Chapter. This law has been set out fully in
the statement of facts. Under the first subparagraph
cited, it will be observed that the legislature granted
the Tax Commission the power to determine that certain sales were consummated by agents or agencies situated at, connected with, or sent out from premises for
the transaction of business owned or rented by the corporation outside this state. But there is nothing in the
statute which grants the Tax Commission power to determine that sales made by corporations from premises
owned or rented by the corporation outside this state,
were in fact made within this state. The statute very
clearly says that the commission may attribute certai~
sales to business conducted from premises outside the
state, but nowhere are they given the power to determine
that sales which were in fact consummated by agents or
agencies sent out from premises without the state, are
sales which may be attributable to business done within
this state. Under subsection 8 of the same section and
Chapter, the Tax Commission is given further power
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to disregard the nonnal allocation factors, but here
again the legislature limited the Tax Commission in departing from the use of the factors to only those cases
which would subject the taxpayer to double taxation and
to an unconstitutional tax by using the normal allocation
factors. By a careful reading of the two sections above
discussed, and when the two are read together, we believe that it conclusively appears that the intention of
the legislature was to strictly limit the Tax Commission
to those cases, where a corporation doing business in
and out of the State of Utah, would be subjected to more
than its fair portion of tax by the use of the nonnal
allocation factors. It must be remembered in this case
that the Company is not attacking the use of the normal
allocation factors set forth by the legislature, but is contending that the use of these factors properly reflects
income attributable to business done within this state.
The Tax Commission by departing from the use of the
normal allocation factors, is subjecting this corporation
to a burden of taxation which is not contemplated in the
statutes. The Supreme Court of the United States has
consistently held that a state may not tax income which
is not attributable to business done within that state.
This Court citea these cases and recognized this principle in the case of Minneapolis Steel and Machinery
Company vs. Crockett, supra. The Supreme Court of
the United States has also recognized the principle that
a state may tax income attributable to business done
within that state. Perhaps the leading case on this
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question is the case of Underwood Typewriter Company
vs. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113, 65 L. Ed. 165, 41 S. Ct.
45. In this case, the State of Connecticut taxed corporations doing business in and out of the State by apportioning income attributable to business done within the state
by using only the tangible property factor, which is
found in the Utah law. The Supreme Court of the United
States, through Justice Brandies, in upholding the Connecticut law, said the following:
'The legislature, in attempting to put upon
this business its fair share of the burden of taxation, was faced with the impossibility of allocating specifically the profits earned by the processes
conducted within its borders. It therefore adopted a method of apportionment which, for all that
appears in this record, reached, and was meant
to reach, only the profits earned within the state.
"The plaintiff's argument on this branch of the
case", as stated by the supreme court of errors,
"carries the burden of showing that 47 per cent
of its net income is not reasonably attributable,
for purposes of taxation, to the manufacture of
products from the sale of which 80 per cent of
its gross earnings was derived after paying manufacturing costs, "94 Conn 47, 108 Atlantic 159.
The corporation has not even attempted to show
this; and, for aught that appears, the percentage
of net profits earned in Connecticut may have
been much larger than 47 per cent. There is, consequently, nothing in this record to show that the
method of apportionment adopted by the state
was inherently arbitrary, or that its application
to this corporation produced an unreasonable
result.
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"We have no occasion to consider whether
the rule prescribed, if applied under different
conditions, might be obnoxious to the Constitution. Adams Exp. Co. vs. Ohio State Auditor,
166 U. S. 185, 222, 41 L. Ed. 965, 978, 17 S. Ct.
Rep. 604. Nor need we consider the contention
made on behalf of the State, that the statute is
neces-sarily valid, because the prescribed rule of
apportionment is not rigid, and provision is made
for rectifying, by proceedings in the superior
court, any injustice resulting from its application.''
The reasoning applied to the facts in the above case
by Justice BrandieS', does not hold valid all taxes based
upon income where an apportionment factor such as
the one used in Connecticut is applied. The holding in
this case is that such an apportionment factor is not
inherently arbitrary. The corporation in the cited case
did not introduce evidence to show that the use of the
apportionment factor allocated too much income to the
State of Connecticut. In the cited portion of the decision,
Justice Brandies also calls attention to the fact that the
statute is not inflexible, in other words, the tax officials
of the State of Connecticut, if the corporation could
have shown that it was paying a tax on income which
was not attributable to business done in the State of
Connecticut, could have made adjustments. In the case
of Hans Rees Sons, Inc., vs. State of North Carolina
on the relation of Allen J. Maxwell 75 L. Ed. 879, 283
U. S. 123, the State of North Carolina imposed a franchise tax based upon income, using the same apportion-
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ment factor which was used in the Connecticut statute.
In this case, the Company by evidence proved that the
use of the apportionment factor allocated income to the
State of North Carolina was out of proportion with the
business done in that state. The Supreme Court of the
United States held that the tax as applied to the corporation was unconstitutional. Again we find in the case of
Gorham Mfg. Co. vs. Travis, 274 Fed. 975, affirmed in
19·24 in 266 U. S. 265, 69 L. Ed. 279, 45 S. Ct. 80, that the
State of New York imposes a franchise tax based upon
income using the tangible property factor, and where
the taxpayer was given a right to a hearing to determine
whether or not the apportionment factor used properly
reflected income attributable to business done in that
state, the court held that the statute was not inherently
unconstitutional, but that the use of the apportionment
factor did not properly reflect the income of the corporation attributable to business done in the State of New
York.
'Ve cite these cases at this time because the eases,
with the exception of the Hans Rees Sons, Inc., vs. North
Carolina, supra, were decided prior to the enactment of
the Utah law. It is our position that the Tax Revision
Commission appointed by the Governor of the State of
Utah and the legislature, were cognizant of these eases
at the time our law was passed, and that the purpose in
allowing the Tax Commission in certain cases to disregard the use of the normal allocation fractions, was to
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safeguard the Utah law from being declared unconstitu·
tional as being arbitrary where the facts show that the
use of the normal allocation fractions did not as to them
properly reflect the business done by corporations doing
business in and out of the State of Utah.
See also the following cases:
Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton vs. State Tax Commission (1924) 266 U. S. 271, 69 L. Ed.
282.
Singer Mfg. Co. vs. Gilpatric (1922) 98 Conn.
192, 118 Atl. 919.
Internationall1Jlevator Company vs. Thoresen
(1929) 58 N.D. 776, 228 N.W. 192.
A case which we deem to be in point is that of People ex. rel. Studebaker Corporation of America vs. Gilchrist, ct. al., State 'l'ax Commission, 155 N. E. 68, 244
N. Y. 144. In this case, the Studebaker Corporation of
America was a corporation organized under the laws
of the State of New York. All of the capital stock of
the Studebaker Corporation of America was owned by
the Studebaker Corporation, a corporation not organized
under the laws of the state of New York. The Studebaker Corportion of America sold automobiles and parts
manufactured by the parent corporation, such sales being made in the State of New York. The contract of the
subsidiary with the parent was such that the sales company could not make a profit, all of the profits being made
by thC' parent corporation which did no business in the
State of New York. The State of New York imposed a
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franchise tax based upon income. The Tax Commission of New York attempted to adjust the tax to reflect
the proper income of the sales company by apportioning
part of the profit of the parent to business done in the
State of New York. New York had no statute which
allowed the Tax Commission to demand a consolidated
return from the corporation. In discussing the action
of the Tax Commission in attempting to allocate a portion of the income to New York, Mr. Justice Cardoza, the
then Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals in New York,
said the following:
'' 'l'he taxing officers of the state are mere
adminsirative agents. They may not devise new
forms and methods of taxation, however convenient or useful. 'l'hey have no more inherent power to tax a corporation upon the income of its
stockholder where the stockholder is another corporation than they have where the stockholder is
a natural person. 'rhey do not help themselves
by saying that the stockholder is a natural person.
They do not help themselves by saying that the
stockholder in the long run may be expected to
pay the bill, so that little harm will be done, whatever the method of assessment. As·sessment, however handy, must find its warrant in the statute.
A statute leveying a tax will not be extended by
implication beyond the clear import of its terms.
Gould vs. Gould, 245 U. S. 151, 153, 38 S. Ct. 53,
62 L. Ed. 211. If one method of assessment or
collection is pointed out, the courts will not permit the application of another on the theory that
the Legislature might just as well have chosen it,
since in the final devolution of the burden the
result will be the same or, at worst, not widely
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different. U. S. vs. Field 255 U. S. 257, 41 S. Ct.
256, 65 L. Ed. 617, 18 A.L.R. 1461; Stebbins vs.
Kay 123 N. Y. 31, 25 N. E. 207; People ex. rel.
Mutual Trust Company vs. Miller, 177 N. Y. 51,
69, N. E. 124. We take the statute as we find it.
One who serves as a conduit for a payment to
someone else may not be taxed upon that payment
as if he had kept it for himself."
It is the contention of this plaintiff that the Tax
Commission of this state is attempting to do what the Tax
Commission of New York in the cited case attempted to
do, i.e., change the law without authority under the law,
to apportion to this state the income which the Tax Commission would like to have apportioned to the state. We
submit that the legislature in enacting the Utah Franchise Tax limited the Tax Commission in departing from
the normal allocation fraction to only those cases where
the application of the normal fraction would render the
assessment of the tax unconstitutional as to that company.

The courts have recognized the rule that the legislature must set forth the rules for allocating income attributable to business done within any state. This is
not a matter that can be left to the discretion of the administrative body. In the case of Puerto Rico Mere. vs.
Gallardo (1925) 6 F. (2d) 526, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, declared that a statute of
Puerto Rico which made no provision by which the proportion of income attributable to business done in Puerto
Rico could be ascertained, and that in the absence of stat-
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utory provision as to how the share of income fairly and
reasonably attributable to business done in Puerto Rico
could not be made workable, the tax could not be upheld.
In the case of Western Union Telegraph Company vs.
Query (1927) 144 S. C. 244, 142 S. E. 509, the Court held
that a statute that required a taxpayer to allocate income
to the state in its return to the Tax Commission, and that
in the event of the failure of the taxpayer to allocate
such income, the Tax Commission was required to make
such allocation under rules and regulations promulgated
by the Commission, that such a statute was unconstitutional. The same rule was laid down in the case of Commission vs. P. Lorillard Company (1921) 129 Va. 74, 105
S. E. 683. If these laws were held to be an improper
delegation of power by the legislature to the administrative bodies without any showing that the formula as
used by the administrative bodies was unreasonable or
arbitrary, certainly a departure from an allocation factor which has been laid down by the legislature and is
manufactured out of the whole cloth by the administrative body, is unconstitutional even though the legislature
had intended that the Tax Commission have this power.
The 'l'ax Commission, if its decision in this case is upheld by this Court, could place a different construction
on what constituted a sale attributable to business done
within this state on every merchandising corporation
doing business within and without this State, according
to the fancy of the Commission.
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The next question as we view the case is whether
or not (if we ooncede, which we do not, that the Tax)
Commission has the power to ignore the allocatio~ fraction) there are sufficient findings or is there sufficient
evidence t:n this record to justify the Commission in making such a finding or in reaching the conclusion which
it has reached.
2.

The decision of thl~ 'l'ax Commission in the case before the court does not set forth any findings of fact,
but is merely a decision of conclusions. An examination
of the record which has been certified to this court will
not reveal one iota of evidence which would justify the
Tax Commission in determining that the normal allocation fraction does not apply. It is the position of this
plaintiff that this case is the converse to the Underwood
Typewriter Company vs. Chamberlain, supra; the Hans
Rees Sons, Inc., vs. State of North Carolina, supra; and
Gorham Mfg. Company vs. Travis, supra.

We say this

because in the three cited cases the corporations were
attacking the normal statutory method of allocating income. In this case the plaintiff contends that the normal
statutory method properly allocates income and the Tax
Commission is the one who is attempting to disprove
that the statutory method is not proper. It is our contention that the burden was on the Tax Commission to
prove that the plaintiff Company in the exercise of its
franchise, conducted its business in a manner which precluded it from apportioning its income to business done

in the State of Utah in the normal manner. We have
outlined very fully in our statement of facts the method
in which the California Packing Corporation conducts
its business and we can find nothing which would justify
a conclusion that it operated its business any differently
than any other manufacturing and merchandising company. A case which we deem to be directly in point relative to the burden of proof, is Curtis Companies, et.
al., vs. Wisconsin Tax Commission, decided December
5, 1933, 251 N. W. 497. In this case, the Wisconsin 'l'ax
Commission had the power to require consolidated returns where a wholly owned subsidiary filed under the
Wisconsin act and the commission did not deem that
the return of the subsidiary corporation reflected true
income. This case is a good deal the same as the Studebaker Corporation of America vs. Gilchrist, supra, except that in this case the Wisconsin law gave the power
to the Commission to require a consolidated return between the parent and the subsidiary. A consolidated
return was filed and additional tax was assessed by the
Wisconsin Commission. A review of the assessment was
asked by the Company and the case decided by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. The action of the Commission was reversed for the reason that the Commission
made no finding or was there any evidence in the record
that the contract between the parent and the subsidiary
was unreasonable. The Court held that in the absence
of any evidence showing an intent to evade the tax, the
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Commission was not justified m demanding a consolidated return.
The plaintiff in this case makes the same contention
that where there is no evidence or no findings that the
conduct of the business of the company is in any way exceptional or that the business is conducted in such a way
that the use of the normal allocation factors does not
apply, that the decision based upon mere conclusions of
the Tax Commission is wholly void and contrary to law.
Upon this point, we believe that the language of Mr.
Justice Cardoza in the case of Studebaker Corporation
of America, vs. Gilchrist, supra, is also applicable.
As was stated in our statement of facts, the Commission have certified, as part of the record in this case,
to the Supreme Court, the returns filed by the Utah Packing Corporation. We can anticipate that the Commission will make some contention that these returns are in
some way applicable to the case now before the Court.
We believe that we can anticipate the arguments which
will be made and the use to which the Commission will
try to put the inclusion of the returns of the Utah Packing Corporation. For that reason, we are going to give
the Court our views as to why these returns are not
competent evidence, and will assist the Court in no way
in deciding this case. It was set out in our statement
of facts that the Utah Packing Corporation did business
only in the State of Utah. The books and records of the
Utah Packing Corporation at the time it filed returns

26
with the State Tax Commission, were kept separately
from those of the parent, the California Packing Corporation. 'l'he gross income of the Utah Packing Corporation was the amount of money paid by the California
Packing Corporation to the Utah Packing Corporation
for the products which it manufactured. We anticipate
that it will be the contention of the Commission that the
returns of the Utah Packing Corporation would reflect
the income of the business done by the California Packing Corporation in the State of Utah, if the California
Packing Corporation filed its returns on a separate accounting basis which showed only profit d~.rived from the
Utah operations of the California Packing Corporation.
We submit that any such argument is so far-fetched
and is so subject to variables, that the returns of the
Utah Packing Corporation are absolutely worthless to
sustain any such contention. The conditions of the market at the time the Utah Packing Corporation filed its
returns may have been wholly different than the condition of the market at the time the return here undet
question was filed. There is no evidence in the record
as to what market conditions were at the time the Utah
Packing Corporation filed its returns or what market
conditions were at the time the California Packing Corporation filed its return. The condition of the market
may have made the difference between profit and loss
of Utah operations. At the time of the hearing, the
Commission requested that the California Packing Corporation file a return, if it could do so, on a separate
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accounting basis. Because all of the subsidiaries of the
California Packing Corporation had been consolidated
and their accounting system was such that they could
not segregate the Utah operations from the other operations of the corporation, it was impossible to file the
return on a separate accounting basis showing Utah
operations. 'l'he Supreme Court of the United States
in the cases which have been heretofore cited have recognized that large corporations operate as a unit and
that their operations cannot be broken down to cover
profits earned from any one state or district. This is
true with the California Packing Corporation. The
entire operation is a consolidated and unitary one. It
might very well be that the California Packing Corporation in its operation for the year here in question lost
money on its Utah operations but made money, for example, on its Florida grapefruit canning operations.
There is no way of determining just where the profits
were made. If it is true that their profits were made
from operations outside of the State of Utah, and this
is entirely probable and possible, then the State of Utah
is deriving profits from business done outside of the
state. It is our position that by the unitary method of
operation the amount of tax paid by this corporation
will equalize in the years when the Utah crop and pack
is unprofitable the State of Utah will have the advantage
of packs in other states which are profitable, and so in
years when the Utah crop and pack is good and that in
other states is bad, it might be that some profit will be
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lost to this state. We believe that this amply illustrates
the utter futility to this court, in considering the returns
of the Utah Packing Corporation as having any bearing
whatsoever on this case. ]-,or all that appears from thi.;
record, the canneries located in this state may not even
have operated in the State of Utah in the year under consideration and still, the California Packing Corporation
made a profit as a unit, and Utah received its portion of
that profit. We submit to the Court that the returns
filed by the Utah Packing Corporation in prior years
have no bearing, weight, or relevancy to the issues involved in this case, and that such returns should be
ignored by the Court.
3.

It is the position of the plaintiff that the Com-

mission by departing from the use of the normal allocation fraction is subjecting this taxpayer to double taxation, and that by s,o doing, the Commission is violating
the clear mandate of the law and of the 14th Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States by taking the
property of this plaintiff without due process of law.
Subsection 8 of Section 21, Chapter 13 of Title 80,
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, specifically directs the
Tax Commission to allocate income on business done
within the State of Utah in such a manner as to avoid
double taxation. It is the contention of this plaintiff
that the Tax Commission have flown directly in the face
of this direction in the decision in this case. The decision of the Tax Commission, instead of tending to avoid

a double taxation on the income of this corporation, have
made it more possible that the same income will be
taxed, in different jurisdictions. To illustrate our point,
if the State of California, (which has a franchise tax
very similar to ours), construed sales as being made
within the state where they are made by agents or
agencies working from offices or premises located in the
State of California, then the sales made by the California Packing Corporation of its merchandise which
was stored in Utah at the time of the sale, such sales
would be taken into consideration in determining the
allocation factor for allocating income attributable to
business done in the State of California. The State Tax
Commission by determining that such sales were made
in the State of Utah is subjecting the same income to
tax as being attributable to business done within the
State of Utah. If this were true of all states in which
the California Packing Corporation does business, then
the same income could be subject to three or four taxes.
But if the State Tax Commission adopted the normal
allocation factors and the statutory definition of sales,
then the same income of this corporation would not be
subject to a double tax. We cannot see by what stretch
of the imagination the Tax Commission can determine
that a sale is attributable to business done in the State
of Utah, merely because the goods which are sold are
located in the State at the time of sale. It might be,
under the theory of the Tax Commission, that the California Packing Corporation would ship a car of Florida
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grapefruit to the State of Utah and warehouse it, and
later, by salesmen located in the State of Idaho, sell
all of the grapefruit in the State of Idaho. Certainly
the transaction could not be said to be attributable to
business done within the state of Utah merely because
the corporation had used a Utah warehouse. Under the
decision of the Commission, that sale of goods in Idaho
would be determined to have been consummated in the
State of Utah and a tax upon the income, paid to the
State of Utah. Idaho could also determine that the
sales were consummated in that state. We believe that
any such ruling is so arbitrary and unreasonable on its
face that this court cannot reach any other conclusion
but that the administrative legislation by the State Tax
Commission is not warranted by the statutes of the State
and is on its face an unconstitutional taking of the property of this plaintiff without due process of law. See
the cases of Carlos Ruggles Lumber Company, vs. Commissioner (1927) 261 Mass. 445. 158 N. E. 899, Arpin vs.
Eberhardt (1914) 158 Wis. 20, 147 N. E. 1016. The
Crescent Mfg. Company vs. South Carolina Tax Commission, 129 S. C. 480, 124 S. E. 761. We also wish to call
the Court's attention to the cases which have been cited
heretofore in this brief. The Courts in the cited cases
have uniformly held that a state may only tax that income which is derived from business done within the
state. Merely because the property is stored in the
State of Utah prior to sale does not make such a sale
attributable to business done within the State of Utah.
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We submit that the application of the statute by the Tax
Commission in its decision is unconstitutional as taxing
income which can in no way be attributable to business
done within this state. We appreciate, as we have said
before, the use of allocation fractions in measuring business done within any state is inherently arbitrary, but
for an administrative agency to promulgate decisions
which are even more arbitrary than the statute itself, is
on its face unconstitutional. The State Tax Commission
has substituted its definition of a sale, for the definition
of the legislature, without any delegation of power by
the legislature to the Tax Commission. It is just a case
of an administrative body making an arbitrary formula
worse. We submit that as to this corporation the decision of the State Tax Commission in disregarding the
normal allocation fractions and setting up one of its
own, is unconstitutional and is depriving this company
of its property without due process of law. The decision of the Commission should be rectified by this
Court.

The C ommissi,on by so including financial revenue is violating the clear mandate of the statute. This
income cannot under the law be attributable to business
done in the State of Utah.
4.

Subsection 1 of Section 21 of Chapter 13, Title 80,
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, which has been quoted,
and subsection 3 of the same section which provided as
follows:
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'' Rent·s, interest and dividents derived from
business done in this state, less related expenses,
shall be allocated to this state."
It is the Company's interpretation of the law that where
rents, interest, and dividends are derived from business
done in this state than the full amount of such income
received in this manner shall be allocated to the State in
full and under no interpretation of the statute shall such
income be allocated by the use of apportionment factors.
The State Tax Commission in its decision, have determined that the interest and dividends herein received by
the company, were not received in connection with business done at any particular place but were received in
the conduct of the general business of the company. It
is our position that intangibles and also the income
from intangibles must have a situs at some particular
place, either the domicile of the owner or they must
acquire a business situs for the purpose of taxation.
See also the following cases:
Shaffer vs. Carter 252 U.S. 37, 64 L. Ed. 445.
Travis vs. Yale and T. Mfg. Co. 252 U.S. 60,
64 L. Ed. 460.
Meyer, Auditor of Oklahoma vs. ·wells Fargo
and Co., 223 U. S. 298, 56 L. Ed. 445.
The intangibles from which interest and dividends were
received, had neither a situs in the State of Utah by
reason of domicile, this company being a New York corporation, nor had they acquired a business situs. The
business situs of the intangibles was at the main place
of business in San Francisco. There is no finding made
by the Commission that any of the intangibles were
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located in the State of Utah. The statute says that income derived "from business done outside this state
shall not be allocated to this state". Surely there is no
evidence in this record that this income was received
from business done within this state. The question as
to the situs of intangibles for purposes of taxation, has
arisen a great number of times in inheritance tax cases.
The rule first adopted by the Supreme Court of the
United States was that intangibles have a situs for tax
purposes at the domicile of the owner. Blodgett vs.
Silberman, 277 U. S. 1, 48 S. Ct. 410; Farmers Loan and
Trust Company vs. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 50 S. Ct.
Rep. 98; Baldwin vs. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 50 S. Ct.
Rep. 436; Beidler vs. South Carolina Tax Commission,
282 U. S. 1, 51 S. Ct. Rep. 54. The Supreme Court of
the United States susequent to the decisions in the above
cited cases has to some extent modified the rule and
has held that intangibles can acquire a business situs
in a state other than where the owner is domiciled.
See the case of Wheeling Steel vs. Fox, 298 U. S. 193,
80 L. Ed. 1143. In this case, the Steel Company was
incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware,
and its principal place of business was located at Wheeling, vVest Virginia. The State of West Virginia imposed
a tax on the intangibles in accordance with their law.
The company contended that the situs of the intangibles
for the purpose of taxation was at the domicile of the
owner, which was the State of Delaware. The Supreme
Court of the United States held that because the Com-
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vany held the intangibles in its main office in West Virginia, and dividends and interest were received in West
Virginia, that the intangibles had acquired a situs for
tax purposes in the State of West Virginia and were
properly taxed in that state. In the case now before
the Court, the intangibles under consideration have
never been in the State of Utah, dividends and interest
are received at a place outside the State of Utah, and
the domicile of the corporation is located in the State of
New York. The receipt of the income from these intangibles cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be
deemed to be attributable to any business done within
this state. The statute has specifically set forth the
manner in which such income must be allocated. Certainly the holding and the receipt of interest and dividends from the intangibles in a place outside of this
state cannot be construed to be attributable to business
done within this state. The case of Stanley Works vs.
Hackett Conn., decided March 4, 1937, 190 At. 743, is a
case which construes the meaning of the phrase ''from
business done". The corporation in this case was organized under the laws of Connecticut. It owned the
stock of three Canadian corporations from which it
received dividends. The provision of the Connecticut
Statute relative to dividends, interest and rentals is as
follows:
"Interest, dividends, royalties and gains
from sales of intangible assets, less related expenses, when received by a company having its
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principal place of business within the state, shall
be allocated to the state and, when received by a
company having its principal place of business
without the state shall be allocated without the
state; provided, when it can be clearly established that such income is received in connection with
business within the state, such income shall be
allocated to the state without regard to the location of the principal place of business of the taxpayer, and a similar rule shall apply to such income received in connection with business without
the state."
Sec. 420 c (1) Chapter 66 b Cumulative Supplement of the General Statutes of Connecticut,
1935.
This case is interesting because of the construction
which the Connecticut Court put on the phrase "in connection with business". The Court held that all of the
dividends were earned upon business done in the Domimon of Canada and should be allocated outside the
state.
Under the provisions of the Utah Statute, this income must be allocated wholly within the State of Utah
or without the State of Utah. The Company in its return has conceded that certain rents were derived from
property located within the State of Utah, and in its
return allocated the whole of the income to business done
in the State of Utah and has not attempted to have this
income allocated by use of the apportionment factor.
We submit that this method of reporting is in absolute
conformity with the statute and that the interest, dividends and rents reported as received from business done

36

without the State of Utah were by the taxpayer properly excluded as having any bearing on business done in
this state, by the taxpayer. The State Tax Commission
in its decision has again wholly ignored the clear mandate of the statute and has legislated a method of apportionment entirely of its own which can be justified neither
by the statute nor by the law.
5. The inclusion of such financial revenue and the
subjecting of such incorne to the allocation fact.or, subjects this plaintiff' to double taxation contrary to the
rnandate of the Franchise Tax Act, and the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

The whole legislative intent in enacting the franchise tax law as we have heretofore stated, has been an
attempt to eliminate all possible double taxation of income. Again the commission by its decision has fostered, rather than eliminated, the possibility of double taxation, for example the California law relative to the
specific allocation of financial revenue, is similar to the
Utah law. If the business situs theory, for the taxation
of intangibles or the income from intangibles is adopted
then the full amount of the financial revenue (except
that portion which the company concedes was attributable to business done in the State of Utah) would be
specifically allocated to the State of California. Such
income would not be subject to any apportionment factor.
The State of California would receive a tax upon the
full amount of the income and the State of Utah would
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attempt to tax a portion of it. And so, if the taxable
situs of the income was the domicile of the corporation,
then the State of New York would tax the full amount
of the income and the State of Utah would tax a portion
of it. ~rhe method devised by the State Tax Commission
may be a fair and equitable method and it might be
proper if it were adopted by all states, but it is not provided for by the statutes of this State nor of any other
state which we know. We wish to call the Court's
attention to the language of the Supreme Court of the
United States relative to double taxation of intangibles
in the cases of Blodgett vs. Silberman, supra; Farmers
Loan and Trust Company vs. Minnesota, supra; Baldwin vs. Missouri, supra; Beidler vs. South Carolina Tax
Commission, supra; and also in the case of First National Bank of Boston vs. Main, 284 U. S. 312·, 52 S. Ct.
Rep. 174. We submit that the attempt of the Tax Commission to tax this income as being attributable to business done in the State of Utah is wholly arbitrary and
unconstitutional for the reason that it deprives this taxpayer of its property without due process of law.

The inclusion of financial revenue which is not
attributable to business done within this state by using
an allocation fraction which does not take into consideration intangibles located in and out of the State of Utah,
is contrary to the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution by reason of the fact that it takes this taxpayers
property without due process o/law.
6.
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In detennining the allocation factors, the Court will
observe that the only things taken into consideration for
determining the amount of income to be apportioned to
the State of Utah is tangible property in and out of the
State of Utah, salaries and wages paid in and out of
the State of Utah, and sales assignable to business done
in and out of the State of Utah. In no place in the statute for the apportionment of income are intangibles from
which the Company receives rents, interest and dividends, or as we have tenned it, financial revenue, taken
into consideration. The case which we deem to be direcly in point in the case of People ex. rel. Alpha Portland Cement Company vs. Knapp et. al., State Tax Commission, is a New York case decided November 23, 1920,
230 N. Y. 48, 129 N. E. 202, Certiorari denied by the
Supreme Court of the United States, 256 U. S. 702, 41
S. Ct. Rep. 624.
'l'he corporation was organized under the laws of
New Jersey and was doing business in the State of New
York. A corporation which was doing business in and
out of the State of New York was by statute required
to allocate its income by using the following allocation factors: The real property and the tangible personal property in New York are to be
compared with the like property in New York and
elsewhere.

'rhe bills and accounts resulting from man-

ufacturing, sales and services in New York, are to be
compared with the like bills and accounts in New York
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and elsewhere. The shares of stock in other corporations, if found to have a situs in New York, but not exceeding 10 per cent of the value of the local realty and
the local tangible personalty, are to be compared with ·
the total shares in other corporations, but not exceeding
10 per cent of all realty and all the tangible personalty.
The Statute made no provision for interest paid on
bonds and a foreign corporation paid a tax on income
which included interest on bonds. The value of the bonds
in no way entered into the determination of the allocation fraction.
Cardoza Justice
"I think, therefore, that in substance, though
not in form, in tendency, though not in name,
this tax is equivalent to a tax upon relator's income. The only question, then, is whether the
method of allocation is reasonably adapted to the
apportionment of ineome according to the situs
of its origin. 'rhe State substantially concedes
that a tax on income could not stand if allocated
on such a basis. Meyer, Auditor of Oklahoma vs.
Wells Fargo and Company 223 U.S. 298, 32 S. Ct.
218, 56 L. Ed. 445; Shaffer vs. Carter, 252 U. S.
37, 40 S. Ct. 221, 64 L. Ed 445 ; and Travis vs.
Yale and Towne Manufacturing Company 252
U. S. 60, 40 S. Ct. 228, 64 L. Ed. 460, are sufficient
in themselves to justify the concession."
"In the first case the tax was measured by
the entire income. The scheme of allocation limited the assessors to the comparison of the receipts of business done within the state with the
receipts of business there and elsewhere. Investments in bonds and lands were disregarded
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in the apportionment, though the income from
such investments was included in the measure.
On that ground, as well as on others, the statute
was held invalid. There is no distinction between
that case and this (so far as the objection just
stated is concerned), except in the label of the
burden. Here, a·s there, the statute prescribes a
rule of allocation which as applied to foreign corporations holding bonds and shares in other
states, involves an artificial and arbitrary augmentation of the value of the local privilege. It
measures the value of the franchise, here and
elsewhere, by income from all sources, and excludes some of the same sources when the value
is apportioned, to take from assets elsewhere is
equivalent to adding to assets here. The statute
would be little different in principle if it announced the arbitrary rule that all investments in bonds
and stocks should be conclusively presumed to
have their situs in New York. The resulting vice
in the proportion is not the consequence of adventitious circumstances of inequalities developing unexpectedly in the practical workings of the
statute, but hardly to be avoided by reasonable
foresight. The exclusion of bonds and stocks is
the result of an explicit mandate. The principle
of allocation is not followed to its natural and
obvious outcome in accordance with the situs of
the assets, but is consciously checked, its normal
course is thwarted, by an artificial and designed
exception. Something which, in the absence of
express exclusion, would be within its operation,
is knowingly taken out of it. I am unable to
avoid the conclusion that a method of apportionment which purposely ignores realties, which
compels an asses·sor to look to some of the assets
only, and close his eyes to all others, is arbitrary
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and unreasonable in its increase of the local
burden.''
The holding in this case clearly renders the attempted method of apportioning income derived from intangibles unconstitutional under the 14th Amendment of the
Federal Constitution, by reason of the fact that it takes
this taxpayers property without due process of law.
SUMMARY
The questions of law which we have deemed to be
involved in this case are somewhat interlocking. We
have tried to make this division of our points in such
a manner as to clarify the issues. We may or may not
have succeeded in doing this. Practically all of the
cases cited under the first three points discussed, have
a definite bearing on the last three points discussed.
·we have not cited these cases again for the reason that
we believe the Court in reading the cited cases will recognize this fact. It is our position hat the Commission
by its interpretation of the statutes of the State of
Utah, relative to the allocation and apportionment of income to business done in the State of Utah, and placed
upon those statutes an unconstitutional interpretation.
The rule of law that where there are two possible constructions of a statute, the Court must adopt that construction which will render the statute constitutional, is
so elementary, that we do not believe that it necessitates
the citing of any cases. The plaintiff does not contend
that the statutes are unconstitutional, but it does con-
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tend that the interpretation and construction placed upon
the statutes by the Tax Commission in its decision in this
case, if such interpretation and construction is correct,
is unconstitutional. We earnestly submit that this corporation in filing its franchise tax return followed the
clear mandate, intent and spirit of the statutes. There is
no evidence that the use of the normal method of allocation of income does not properly reflect the income of
this corporation attributable to business done in the
State of Utah. The method adopted by the Commission in allocating financial revenue, is not justified by the
statutes, the law, and is contrary and in violation to the
Constitution of this State and of the United States.
We ask this Court to set aside the deficiency as proposed
by the State Tax Commission and to direct the State Tu
Commission to accept the return of this taxpayer as it
was filed, and to accept as payment in full, the taxes
which were paid by the taxpayer upon the filing of the
return.
Respectfully submitted,

DEVINE, HOWELL & STINE
NED WARNOCK
Attorneys for Plaintiff.

